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~E past five years in Illinois have been a period of very unusual
interest in the field of tax litigation. It would be difficult to find
another instance in which so many important cases, involving
questions of such vital consequence from a legal and fiscal point of view,
have found their way to the court of last resort of the state and to the
federal courts within an equal period of time. Included in the series of
cases were several involving the validity under the present state constitu-
tion of forms of taxation which, though familiar elsewhere, were novel
in Illinois experience.' The enactment of these new tax laws was a result
of substantially the same forces and conditions which operated to clog
the courts with suits in which the legality of administrative acts and pro-
cedures incident to the enforcement of the general property tax was sub-
jected to vigorous and bitter attack by thousands of. embittered property
owners. They were in response to the need for more revenue and a wider
distribution of the tax burden. For many years the burden of taxation on
real property has been steadily increasing. Attempts which have been
made on several occasions to amend the antiquated revenue article of
the state constitution2 in such a manner as to empower the legislature to
establish a modern revenue system based upon the principle of an equi-
table distribution of the tax burden have foundered upon the shoals of
jealousy and suspicion between the people of the urban and rural areas
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'In Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 Ill. 579, i82 N.E. 909 (1932) the court held unconstitutional a
state income tax law upon the ground that income was "property" within the meaning of Arti-
cle 9, Sections i and 2, of the Illinois Constitution, and that the graduated feature of the tax
violated the requirement that taxes on property be based upon value and be uniform. See
Hughes, The Constitutionality of the Income Tax Law of 1932, 1 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 124 (1933).
In Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 44i, i86 N.E. I23 (1933), the 1933 retail sales tax was held un-
constitutional because it was found to involve discriminatory exemptions and contained a
clause involving double appropriation of funds.
In Reif et al. v. Barrett, 188 N.E. 889 (Ill. 1933) The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act of 1933,
imposing on persons engaged in selling tangible personal property at retail a tax measured by
gross receipts was sustained.
2Article 9, Section i: "The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be
needed by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to-the value of his, her, or its property-such value to be ascertained by some person
or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and
not otherwise; .... .
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of the state and the indifference of a large part of the voting population
to the issues involved.
In the meantime there has been a steady growth in the variety and
quantum of governmental activities, and a concomitant increase in the
demands for revenue. The normal solution, viz., recourse to new sources
of revenue by new types of taxation, has encountered the obstacle of an
obsolete constitution. 3 Year by year the property tax rate has continued
to increase, until at the present time in Chicago the average rate as ap-
plied to thirty-seven per cent of the full value theoretically determined by
the assessment is close to eight per cent.
As long as the post-war prosperity continued, the mounting burden of
taxation on real estate, while it gave rise to a considerable volume of
grumbling in the press and elsewhere by individuals and small groups, did
not become so unendurable as to produce an organized revolt of large pro-
portions. It was not until 1928 that the dissatisfaction with conditions of
assessment in Cook County became so general and articulate as to produce
decisive action by the State Tax Commission in the form of an order of
reassessment of all real estate in Cook County. It is possible that, if the
reassessment had been carried through to completion in the conditions of
1925 or 1926, the organized tax strike and the resulting litigation which
for a considerable period well nigh paralyzed the collection of taxes would
not have occurred. But by the time taxes were again extended on the
basis of the new assessment roll the collapse of 1929 had passed into his-
tory and economic paralysis was spreading over the country.
The coincidence of high 1928 valuations, the two years' interruption of
tax extension, shrinking incomes from property ownership and business,
high interest rates on mortgages floated in boom times upon the basis
of inflated valuations, and a greatly reduced economic capacity on the
part of the body of taxpayers combined to create an impossible situation
when, after two years, the reassessment was finally completed and ex-
tension and collection of taxes was resumed. The percentage of taxes in
default steadily increased to unprecedentedly high levels; the diminishing
stream of tax payments which continued to flow in was for the most part
already hypothecated by the issuance of tax warrants at increased rates
of interest by desperate government officials. The situation was greatly
complicated by a tax strike of formidable proportions, fomented by an
association composed of thousands of protesting real estate owners, in-
cluding many whose holdings of real estate were large. The leaders of this
3 Supra note 2. The revenue article does, it is true, include power to levy a variety of ex-
cise and occupation taxes, but despite this it is one of the most narrow in its grants of power to
be found in state constitutions.
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organization carried on an active propaganda by radio and other means
to secure adherents. Its members paid a small percentage of the amount
of taxes assessed upon their properties into the treasury of the association.
The large fund thus raised was used to finance propaganda, to pay sub-
stantial salaries to the permanent officials, and to cover the heavy legal
costs of initiating and prosecuting to the finish litigation which it was
confidently predicted would bring to the overburdened owners of real
estate substantial relief. 4
The leaders of the movement boldly advised and urged owners of real
estate to withhold payment of all taxes until the suits attacking the valid-
ity of the Cook County assessment rolls for 1928 and 1929 had been de-
cided. This counsel, as will later appear, proved in the final outcome to be
bad, but it was the more effective at the time because of the existence in
Illinois of an unjust rule which makes any real property tax payment a
voluntary one virtually as a matter of law.s Full advantage was taken of
this fact in the tax strike propaganda. It was iterated and reiterated that
property owners who paid any portion of their taxes ran the risk of pay-
ing more than the courts might decide to be lawfully due, and that to the
extent of such overpayment such taxpayers would be without legal re-
course. Had the Illinois law permitted complaining taxpayers to preserve
their legal position by payment of their taxes under specific written pro-
test,6 it seems probable that the volume of tax payments might have been
substantially increased.
This reluctance to pay any taxes was accentuated by an apparently
formidable but completely abortive movement to secure the issuance of a
huge amount of long-term bonds to fund the unpaid taxes for a period of
from one to three years, the burden of which would have tended to fall
quite disproportionately upon those taxpayers who had already paid. In
the meantime, the load of those who had defaulted their tax payments be-
came steadily greater with the accumulation of tax penalties, even though
the penalty dates were extended several times by emergency legislation
in the hope of breaking the strike. Under the pressure of necessity, con-
siderable reductions in the budgets of tax-spending bodies were being
4 The character of the activities of this organization and the nature of the relationship be-
tween it and its members are quite fully set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Farthing in the
case of People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E.
823 (1933).
s See School of Domestic Arts v. Harding, 331 Ill. 330, 163 N.E. 15 (1928), and notes on the
case in 29 Col. L. Rev. 227 (1929) and 23 Ill. L. Rev. 821 (1929). Cf. Lefevre v. Lee County,
353 Ill. 30, i86 N.E. 536 (1933).
6 Albro v. Kittelle, 42 R.I. 270, x07 At. 198 (ig) was decided in a state where substan-
tially this rule is in effect.
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made, but these economies were offset to a substantial degree by the heavy
interest charges on borrowing which the stoppage of tax revenues necessi-
tated. Soon the tragic spectacle was presented of payrolls of public school
teachers and other public employees many months in arrears, a condition
which unfortunately still continues. After five years tax litigation or its
aftermath still exerts its paralyzing influence upon the collection of taxes.7
It is the writer's purpose to examine, in the light of this historical back-
ground and the present situation, certain aspects at least of this litigation.
What are the basic legal issues which the litigation has involved? To what
extent have these issues been faced and solved by the courts and to what
extent evaded? Are we warranted in concluding that the evils and weak-
nesses of our fiscal system are soluble in some measure by recourse to the
courts or is this a situation in which judicial intervention means simply
confusion worse confounded? These are questions which must be faced
if government is to chart a course for the future intelligently.
While it was only one of several important cases, the case of People
ex rel. McDonough v. Cesar' was the spearhead of the tax strikers' attack
upon the assessment roll, as it was, also the case which received the great-
est publicity. Inasmuch as the case involved most of the important issues
and was the one in which the revolting taxpayers came nearest to success,
it affords a good point of departure and demands careful consideration.
The case arose out of an application by the county collector filed in the
county court for judgment and order of sale against all the lots and lands
upon which taxes and special assessments for the year 1928 remained due
and unpaid as described in a delinquent list filed, as provided by law.
An order was entered by the court that all persons interested in the lands
and lots described and desiring to make objections to the judgment and
order of sale should file such objections by a specified date. In due course
an objection was filed upon behalf of various parties, including Mrs.
Cesar. 9 A similar procedure was followed in the case of lands and lots on
which 1929 taxes were delinquent, and again objections were filed upon be-
half of a group of property owners including Mrs. Cesar. In both years the
court entered an order for judgment and sale of the properties described,
excepting those for which objections had been entered in accordance with
7 According to figures published in the Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1934, announced by
County Treasurer Joseph B. McDonough, $765,000,0o0 in taxes have been paid for the years
1928-1931, with S268,ooo,ooo still in default.
349 Il1. 372, 182 N.E. 448 (1932), certiorari denied 288 U.S. 6o3, 53 Sup. Ct. 386 (933).
Accord: People ex rel. McDonough v. Reinecke, x88 N.E. 455 (Ill. 1933).
9 It is stated by C. J. Heard that the abstract does not show that Mrs. Cesar was one of the
parties who filed the objection, but she was treated by the county court, and in the briefs of
both appellants and appellees, as if she were. 182 N.E. 448, 449.
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the rules of the court. Later, the City of Chicago was permitted to inter-
vene and to file written briefs and arguments. Also the objections for the
two years were consolidated and adjudicated in a single proceeding.
Upon completion of the hearing, the county court, Edmund K. Jarecki,
Judge, sustained Mrs. Cesar's objections and refused judgment and order
of sale for the general taxes for 1928 and 1929. In his judgment Judge
Jarecki incorporated the finding that the entire tax levied for the two
years was invalid.
At the time the cause came on for hearing, counsel for the objector was
permitted to file an amendment to the objections entered for both 1928
and 1929 taxes which was of great importance in the subsequent history
of the case.'0 This amendment contains the gravamen of the complaint
which formed the ostensible basis, at least, of the tax strike. It charged
that the board of assessors (of Cook County), for the years 1920 to and in-
cluding 1929
.... have willfully, knowingly, and intentionally failed, refused and neglected to
value and assess vast amounts of personal property in Cook County, Illinois, subject
to taxation and not exempt under the laws of Illinois; that the said board of review
(of Cook County) has during the same period willfully, knowingly and intentionally
failed, refused and neglected to assess all such personal property subject to assessment
which is not assessed by the said board of assessors; that for upwards of ten years last
past, including the years 1928 and 1929, said board -of assessors have deliberately,
systematically, and willfully omitted to value and assess for taxation vast amounts of
personal property in Cook County subject to taxation and not exempt under the laws
of Illinois; that during the same period of time the said board of review deliberately,
systematically and willfully failed to correct the assessment as made by the board of
assessors, and also failed to assess vast amounts of personal property subject to taxa-
tion and not exempt under the laws of Illinois and which was not assessed by the board
of assessors.
In his statement counsel for the objector left no room for doubt as to
the radical character of this objection. On the contrary he stated that
it was his purpose "to raise the question of the illegality of the entire as-
sessment in so far as the assessment constitutes a violation of both the
statutes and the constitutions, State and Federal." He asserted that the
issues raised in the case would be limited to two, viz., denial of due process
of law under both constitutions and denial of equal protection of the laws
under both constitutions." Any question which might have been raised
as to fraudulent discrimination in the valuation' of the objector's real
estate as compared with other real estate disappeared from the case.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the state, the judgment of the
county court was sweepingly reversed by unanimous decision and the case
'o 182 N.E. 448, 449. 1 Ibid.
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remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the collector,
with interest and costs.Y The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Heard, asserted that the only question presented was the right of the
county collector to have judgment against the objector's real property
for delinquent taxes. It vigorously declared that the county court was
without jurisdiction to make a finding that the entire taxes against all real
estate in Cook County for the years 1928 and 1929 were invalid. It fur-
thermore held that the finding was based largely upon a mass of incompe-
tent evidence admitted by the county court over the objections of the
counsel for the appellants which tended to show that vast amounts of
personal property of various sorts were not being entered upon the assess-
ment rolls and that no real effort was made by the assessing officials to
find such property and place it there upon a uniform standard of valuation
with real property. But the opinion does admit that there was sufficient
evidence to show that considerable amounts of personal property were not
assessed for these years, and that it was uniform practice in the assessor's
office to place on the roll no returns of personal property of a value under
$2oo.' 3 It was conceded that testimony of the members of the board of
assessors themselves showed that there was much personal property not
assessed which could have been found and assessed if adequate appropria-
tion for staff for this purpose had been made and the same diligence shown
as in the case of assessment of realty. This failure was attributed by them
to deficiency in appropriation and staff, diffieulty of procuring schedules
from citizens, and the short time allowed by law for making an assess-
ment.
The court found that the objector was precluded from relying upon this
apparent lack of uniformity between assessment of real property and
assessment of personal property. As to her assertion that she was de-
prived of due process of law because of the failure of the board of review
to grant her a hearing upon her complaints of improper valuation, it was
held that she was not in position to take advantage of the objection for
several reasons. First, her complaint was fatally defective in that it did
not comply with the lawful rules and regulations of the board because it
gave no information regarding her property but was limited to a state-
12 Supra note 8.
13 It is suggested that the recent decision in People ex rel. McDonough v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. R. Co., i88 N.E. 405 (Ill. 1933) may give unintended encouragement to this
practice. Herein the court held the county collector's practice of making no effort to collect
small personal property tax claims of $20 or less on ground that costs of collection exceed the
amount recovered unlawful as violating the constitutional guaranty of equal taxation, and that
the amount not collected for this reason cannot be included in a subsequent levy to cover loss of
and cost of collection of taxes.
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ment that the property was overassessed. She could not claim lack of uni-
formity as to her personal property assessment since the record did not
show that she had made any return of personal property whatever or that
she had been assessed therefor. It may be noted in passing that the prac-
tice of making no personal property return or at the most a return of only
a small fraction of total personal property holdings was so general among
Chicago taxpayers that few owners of real property could have come into
court with clean hands to complain of such underassessment of personal
property.
The principal ground relied on, however, for denying the objector relief
was her failure to bring a mandamus proceeding in a court of law in order
to compel the board of review to grant her a hearing upon her complaint.
The court also noted that the objector had failed to invoke any of the
penalties provided by law for refusal or willful neglect of any assessor or
any member of a board of review to perform his duty in the matter of
assessing taxable property,' 4 or to attempt to compel by mandamus the
assessment of the omitted personal property.,, It then goes on to say :16
While the law has provided penalties for the refusal or willful neglect of any as-
sessor or member of the board of review to perform his duty in the matter of making
the assessment of taxable property, the invalidity of the whole assessment has never
been held to be one of the results of such refusal or neglect. If the whole real estate
assessment of Cook County were to be held invalid in this case for lack of uniformity,
it would necessarily follow as an inevitable conclusion that the entire personal property
tax as well would be invalid, and that the entire state tax for the years 1928 and 1929
in all the other counties would be invalid as well. Such a result would be not only a
grave injustice to the many thousands of persons against whose property the same
county court of Cook County rendered judgment of sale for delinquent taxes based
on the same assessments of 1928 and 1929, as well as to the hundreds of thousands
of persons who voluntarily paid their taxes. Such a holding would render it possible
for an unscrupulous assessor to prevent government, both local and state, from
functioning.
The court makes the further point that the evidence of the objector
fails to show that she had suffered injury by reason of the discrimination in
favor of personal property which is the basis of the complaint, in that it
does not appear that the taxes upon her real property would have been
decreased if the personal property claimed to have been omitted from the
assessment roll had been assessed, because no evidence was offered to
show the amount of the appropriations made by the numerous taxing
bodies in Cook County in 1928 and 1929 nor that they were operating
upon balanced budgets during those years. It might have added that, in
the absence of proof as to the amount of personal property owned by the
14 182 N.E. 448, 454. 15 Ibid. z6 Ibid.
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objector and the portion thereof assessed for taxation, it might well be
that no net saving would have accrued to her if real property and personal
property had been assessed upon the uniform basis which the constitution
and statutes require.Y
One of the cases chiefly relied upon as authority in the Cesar case was
Bistor et al. v. McDonough,' decided just a few weeks before. The plaintiff
and appellant, Bistor, along with more than five thousand other owners
of real estate, had filed a bill praying for an injunction restraining the
county collector from seeking recovery of judgment for the general taxes
levied on their properties for the year 1929 and from offering to sell, or
making sale of such properties to satisfy the tax demands. A demurrer to
the bill was sustained and the bill was dismissed for want of equity by the
circuit court. The bill alleged deliberate, fraudulent, and illegal omission
to assess and underassessment of personal property, and a resulting dis-
crimination against real property in violation of the uniformity require-
ment of Section i, Article 9, of the state constitution. It further alleged
with considerable detail the omission or the underassessment of various
types of personal property which it was later attempted to establish by
the evidence at the trial in the county court in the Cesar case and the
failure and refusal of the board of review to hear more than a small frac-
tion of the many thousand complaints filed with the board; that the
Illinois tax commission was petitioned to grant relief to the complainants
and other real estate taxpayers but that the commission refused to order
a reassessment of all property in Cook County in accordance with the
constitutional requirements of uniformity; that the complainants knew
that any appeal to the board of assessors, board of review, or the state tax
commission to correct their assessments would be futile.
In affirming the decree below dismissing the bill, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice De Young, pointed out that the power to
impose tax burdens is a legislative power, that the Illinois constitution
vests the power of assessment exclusively in the persons elected or ap-
pointed for that purpose, and that, unless fraud be shown, the courts are
without power to review valuations of property made by the proper au-
thorities. It follows that, in the absence of fraud, the only remedy for
excessive assessment is by application for abatement made to the agencies
created by statute for the purpose of hearing complaints. Even if the
basis of the complaint is fraud, the property owner must exhaust his legal
17 Baker v. Druesdow, 263 U.S. 137, 142, 44 Sup. Ct. 40 (1923); West Virginia Hotel Cor-
poration v. W. C. Foster, 132 So. 842, 847 (Fla. 193i).
"s 348 Ill. 624, ii N.E. 417 (1932). Accord: Koester v. McDonough, 351 Ill. 492, 184 N.E.
826 (933).
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remedies before seeking equitable relief by way of injunction. This the
appellants have failed to do because they have not sought by mandamus
to compel the board of review to review their assessments. The plaintiffs
thus came to grief upon the same shoal which wrecked the objector in the
Cesar case.
The court was not content, however, to stop at this point. It went on
to add to the woes of the striking real estate taxpayers by unequivocally
affirming the position previously taken in a long line of cases 9 that the
contention that the assessments on parcels of real estate are void because
there is discrimination in favor of personal property is untenable.20 It
further declared that the burden was upon landowners asserting that real
estate had been assessed without uniformity to allege facts from which
the court could determine whether the personal property omitted from
the assessment roll was taxable, and that a general allegation to that
effect was a mere legal conclusion and insufficient to show unjust dis-
crimination .2
But the determined taxpayers had not yet exhausted their resources.
If the state courts were not productive of the relief sought, it was in-
evitable that resort should be had to the federal courts. In Ainerican
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. McDonough" the plaintiff, a Massa-
chusetts corporation, which owned a leasehold estate for a long term of
years in certain Cook County real estate, filed a bill in equity in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging the invalidity of
general taxes assessed upon its property for the years 1928 and 1929 and
praying for a decree declaring said taxes to be null and void and that the
defendant, the county collector, be enjoined from selling said real estate
for taxes delinquent for those years. The bill not only alleged violation of
the plaintiff's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitu-
tion and statutes of the state of Illinois through discrimination against
real property by means of fraudulent and deliberate administrative omis-
19 I8I N.E. 417, 421.
20 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Frary, 22 Ii. 34 (1859); Schofield v. Watkins,
22 I. 66 (1859); Merrittv. Farris, 22 Ill 303 (i859); Metz v. Anderson, 23111.463,76 Am. Dec.
704 (i86o); Dunham v. City of Chicago, 55 Ill. 357 (1870); People v. Lots in Ashley, 122 Inl.
297, 13 N.E. 556 (1887); First Nat. Bank of Urbana v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 893
(igio). Would not the logic of the objector's theory in the Cesar case lead to the conclusion
that Illinois has never had a valid assessment roll since the legislature has never provided for
taxation of income recognized as property in Bachrach v. Nelson supra note i, which Article 9
Section i of the Illinois Constitution makes it the duty of the legislature to tax by the rule of
uniformity?
21xi8i N.E. 417, 421.
=I F. Supp. 888 (I93I); affd. by C.C.A. 7 th. 61 F. (2d) 558 (1932); certiorari denied 288
U.S. 603, 53 Sup. Ct. 386 (i933).
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sion and underassessment of personal property, but arbitrary and fraudu-
lent discrimination in that plaintiff's real estate was assessed at a very
much higher percentage of actual value than other real estate in the same
district. It will be noted that no claim of this latter type of discrimina-
tion was involved in the Cesar and Bistor cases. In this case, moreover,
plaintiff offered to pay the amount of tax found to be due.
Again the taxpayer ran into a stone wall. The bill was dismissed for
want of equity and this decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.23 Relief was denied on the authority of Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge
Co. v. Saln. 2 4 The plaintiff had failed to state a case sufficient to con-
stitute a valid cause of action in equity, despite the allegation of refusal
by the board of review to hear and pass upon its objections, because it
had failed to exhaust the remedies provided by the Illinois statutes in
that no objection had been raised in the county court to entry of judg-
ment on the ground of deliberate and fraudulent discrimination in the
assessment.2 5 Until the entry of such judgment and order of sale in the
county court, no lien could attach to the plaintiff's property and no cloud
on title be created. The federal court could not presume that taxing
officers of Illinois would be permitted by its courts to violate the statutes
of the state. One can scarcely wonder if an owner of real property, reading
the opinion in the above case and comparing it with that of the Illinois
Supreme Court in the Cesar case should feel like a ball in a game of battle-
dore and shuttlecock
6
One more chapter in the story of the attempt to gain advantage from
23 Ibid. 24 258 U.S. 122, 66 L.Ed. 496, 42 Sup. Ct. 207 (1922).
25 The court discusses and distinguishes three cases: (i) Cummings v. Merchants' Nat. Bank
of Toledo, xoi U.S. 153, 25 L.Ed. 903 (1879), on ground that that case related to taxation of
bank stock, which had been greatly overvalued in proportion to other property, real and per-
sonal, and was subject to immediate warrant and distraint if the tax not paid; not as a result of
judgment after hearing in state court as in Illinois; (2) Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction
Co. 207 U.S. 20, 52 L.Ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. 7 (1907); on ground that corporate property was there
assessed originally by state board of equalization under a system which clearly denied due
process and equal protection of law, and that there was no appeal from its decision on valuation
under the state law; (3) Greene, Auditor et al. v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S.
499, 61 L.Ed. x280, 37 Sup. Ct. 673 (I9x7), on ground that there the discrimination resulted
from the divergent action of differing assessing boards whose assessments were not subject to
any process of equalization under the state law, the diverse results being due to intentional,
systematic, and persistent undervaluation by one body of officials, presumably known to and
ignored by the other body. It may further be noted that in all these cases there was discrimina-
tion between property falling in the same class. See Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-
Effect of Failure to Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1930).
26 At the time this case was decided, a decision in the Cesar case had been handed down,
being cited at 61 F. (2d) 565, but it was noted parenthetically that a petition for rehearing was
pending. This petition was, of course, denied later by the Illinois Supreme Court.
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the discrimination in favor of personal property remains to be considered.
It will have been noted that in the Cesar case the Supreme Court observed
that no attempt had been made by the objector to compel the assessing
authorities to bring the large amount of omitted or underassessed per-
sonal property alleged to exist onto the assessment roll by mandamus
proceedings.27 A case was soon presented to the court in which the plain-
tiff tried to do that very thing.28 The petitioner sought a writ of manda-
mus in the superior court of Cook County to direct the members of the
board of review29 to add to the assessment roll a vast amount of personal
property which it was alleged was taxable but was not being assessed.
The petition was an elaborate one. After describing the organization
of the board, its practices, and duties, and alleging facts tending to show
that enormous amounts of personal property were not being assessed by
reason of the deliberate failure and neglect of the defendants, in violation
of the uniformity requirements of the constitution and laws of the state,
the petition described in a long series of paragraphs classes and types of
personal property alleged to be omitted or substantially underassessed and
alleged a minimum total valuation for each of such classes. Among them
were estates held in trust by banks and trust companies, funds on deposit
in banks, estates under administration in the probate court,30 aeroplanes
and water craft, automobiles,3" refrigerator cars and other railroad rolling
stock, memberships in the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Stock
Exchange, obligations secured by mortgages and trust deeds on property
in the county and recorded in the county recorder's office, property in
storage warehouses, and merchants' and manufacturers' inventories.
Demurrers to the petition were overruled and an order was entered direct-
ing a writ to issue in accordance with the prayer of the petition. The Su-
preme Court, this time with two of its membefs dissenting, reversed the
27 182 N.E. 448, 454 (1932).
28 People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review of Cook County et al., 351 Ill. 301, 184 N.E. 325
(1933).
29 The new board of appeals was later substituted for the board of review as party appellant.
30 It was alleged with reference to these estates that their values and descriptions and the
names of the owners were set out in full in the inventories and appraisements on file and avail-
able to the board of review in the county treasurer's office and in the inheritance tax depart-
ment of the Attorney General's office. See 184 N.E. 325, 327, paragraph io.
31 It was alleged with reference to automobiles and motor vehicles that more than 500,0o
were owned by residents of Cook County, with a fair cash value in excess of i2o million; that
less than 2o,ooo were assessed by the board of review for the said year; and that the names,
descriptions, and data relative to the automobiles were easily available to the board of review
from the printed public records of the Secretary of State of Illinois. See x84 N.E. 325, 327,
paragraph 13.
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court below and directed that the demurrers, general and special, be sus-
tained.
A perusal of this opinion supplies ample evidence, if evidence were
needed, of the illusory character of mandamus as a remedy for a wide-
spread lack of uniformity in the assessment of property. While the court
declares that upon a sufficient petition and proper showing, the board of
appeals could be compelled by mandamus to assess omitted property or
increase the assessment upon undervalued property, 32 the requirements for
such a showing which are laid down are so severe that no taxpayer or
group of taxpayers could satisfy them. The requirements amount in sub-
stance to this: the petitioner must be prepared to allege and prove the
name and residence of the owners of the omitted or underassessed prop-
erty, the situs and character of the property, and whatever facts are
necessary to show that the property was subject to taxation. In the ab-
sence of such a showing, the court will not presume that the board violated
any duty in failing to assess it. In other words, the petitioner must have
satisfactory proof of all the facts necessary to the preparation of an as-
sessment roll. What the assessing authorities with their staffs and sources
of information have not done either through unwillingness or inability,
the petitioner must do if he is to state a good case for relief by manda-
mus.
33
No implication of criticism of the Supreme Court's general position,
32 A note, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1ooo (1933) contains an excellent discussion of the topic,
Remedies for Unequal Property Tax Assessments, and an extensive collection of authorities.
The baneful effect with regard to uniformity of the very general practice of assessing property
below its true value in order to minimize the number of complaints from property owners and
to obviate the necessity for readjustment in event of a decline in values is pointed out. The
writer of the note also points out the availability-and convenience of the remedy of mandamus
to compel an increase in low assessments where only a few parcels of property have been under,
valued, citing inter alia Board of Equalization v. People ex rel. Goggin, i91 Ill. 528, 6i N.E. 339
(i9oi). See also People ex rel. Webb v. Jones et al., 256 Ill. 364, i0o N.E. 224 (1912) where a
writ was granted to compel board of review to assess certain omitted personal property de-
scribed in the petition, the owners thereof being named therein.
33 The illusory character and complete inadequacy of mandamus as a remedy for the dis-
favored taxpayer in the case of widespread undervaluation was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Sioux City Bridge Company v. Dakota County, 26o U.S.
441, 67 L.Ed. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 190 (1923). It was there held that the complaining taxpayer
was entitled to have its assessment reduced to the prevailing level, despite the statute of Ne-
braska providing that all property should be assessed at one hundred per cent and the fact
that complainant's property was not assessed in excess of that figure. The doctrine estab-
lished by the Nebraska Supreme Court limiting the taxpayer in such cases to a suit for manda-
mus to compel the increase of all other assessments to the same level was held to violate due
process of law. But it should be noted that in the above case a federal right was involved, inas-
much as the taxpayer complained of intentional discrimination as between its real estate and
other real estate in the district.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
however, is intended, for the fatal defects of mandamus as a remedy for
discriminatory assessment, at least where lack of uniformity is extensive,
are inherent in the remedy itself. In order for the writ to be effective, it
must be possible for the court issuing the writ to determine whether it is
being complied with in order that a contempt citation may issue in the
event noncompliance is found. Tested by this standard, the sweeping
writ of mandamus issued by the lower court in the principal case was an
absurdity, unless the court was prepared itself to undertake what would
in effect amount to a reassessment of personal property in Cook County
or else to treat as incontestable fact the allegations of Mr. Koester's peti-
tion and to jail the members of the board of appeals for contempt unless
they succeeded in producing an assessment roll substantially conforming
thereto. He would be a brave man who would accept appointment to or
remain a member of the board with such a threat hanging over him. Sure-
ly only a super-optimist can believe that any mind not equipped with
omniscience could locate and assess fifteen additional billions of personal
property or any large fraction thereof in Cook County, possessed of the
limited powers of inspection and search which Illinois assessors are given
by statute.
Yet there is some reason to agree with the dissenting judges in their
contention that the requirements laid down by the majority, at least
when applied to so large a city as Chicago, virtually deny property owners
any relief. Moreover, if the majority really take seriously the dogma of
uniformity, to which allegiance is rendered in so many Illinois opinions
dealing with assessment, it would seem that the court might safely have
sustained the writ as to certain of the categories of personal property de-
scribed in the petition. Particularly is this true, as the dissent points out,
of trust estates, airplanes and water craft, automobiles the ownership of
which is largely a matter of public record, and memberships in the Board
of Trade and the Stock Exchange, the names and addresses of the owners
of which were listed in the petition. Even a modicum of effort on the part
of the assessors should suffice to place substantially more than five per
cent of automobiles owned by residents of Cook County upon the assess-
ment roll.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the judges realized the hope-
lessness of enforcing even an approach to uniformity in the assessment of
personal property, and that they were reluctant to single out certain
limited classes, which for one reason or another are easier to locate and
assess, and to take effective action to secure their inclusion on the roll of
taxable property. The full assessment of securities in trusts and estates
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in the probate court or held by corporate trustees, for instance, while
securities in general are escaping taxation almost altogether, is not calcu-
lated to appeal to the sense of justice.
The principal objective of all this litigation was to secure an ameliora-
tion of the tax burden of real property by transferring a large portion
thereof to the pocketbooks of the owners of personal property, tangible
and intangible. Leaders of the tax strikers in their utterances expressed
the hope of reducing taxes on real estate from one-half to two-thirds.
Whereas personal property assessments made up about eighteen per cent
of the total assessments for 1927, a truly uniform assessment of all prop-
erty, it was said, would increase that percentage to about sixty per cent.
This was indeed a stake worth playing for, but as might have been ex-
pected it was a stake which the tax strikers failed to win. Their goal would
have been beyond their reach even if the decision of the county court in
the Cesar case had been sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois or the
Supreme Court of the United States. Such a decision would have com-
pelled a general reassessment of all property in Cook County, though it is
well to note that the courts in Illinois could not themselves have ordered
it. 3 4 It would have greatly aggravated the already chaotic condition of
the public finances and its consequences upon the existence and function-
ing of local government in the area affected would have been difficult to
foresee. If such judicial intervention.could possibly have led to a solution
of the tax problem which would have been in general fair and equitable,
the agony and travail which might have been its immediate result would
have been worthwhile. But to attribute to a court order holding an as-
sessment roll invalid the power to cure or even measurably ameliorate the
fiscal ills of Cook County and the state of Illinois is to credit the judicial
process with supernatural powers.
At least two fatal weaknesses in the position and tactics of the striking
taxpayers were apparent to the'dispassionate observer from the very out-
set of the movement. The first was ethical in character and served to im-
peach the moral integrity of the strike. It consisted in the rather general
34 In Wisconsin the courts are given power by statute to order a reassessment directly.
Wisconsin Stat. of 193 1, § 75-54. The power has been exercised in a number of instances but, as
pointed out in 46 Harv. L. Rev. iooo, Ioo4, the results have not been altogether happy. Illinois
courts possess no such statutory power. Hence, if our courts took it upon themselves to declare
an entire assessment roll void, it would be necessary for the State Tax Commission to order a
reassessment as a condition precedent to further property tax extensions. In a few cases courts
have taken such extreme action. Harjim, Inc. v. Owens, 52 F. (2d) 530 (D. Fla. 193); Roberts
v. American Nat. Bank of Pensacola, 94 Fla. 427, 1s So. 261 (1927); Auditor Gen. v. Hughitt,
132 Mich. 311, 93 N.W. 621 (19o3); Peninsular Power Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 195 Wis.
23r, 218 N.W. 371 (1928).
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refusal or failure of the strikers to pay any part of the taxes assessed on
their properties, even such portion as according to their own showing
would still be due if a uniform assessment were to be made.35 On this
ground alone the courts might, upon established principles, have refused
equitable relief.36 He who seeks equity must do equity.
The second error was a failure to analyze and diagnose correctly their
problem. Whether this failure was due to ignorance or duplicity upon the
part of the leaders of the strike we are unable to say, but the fact remains
that the propaganda of the strike attributed the ills of real estate owners
to the inefficiency, neglect, and corruption of administrative officials
charged with the duty of preparing the assessment roll. It would be fool-
ish to deny that the charges of breach of official duty were true. Even in
the assessment of real property, where a reasonable approach to uniform-
ity is possible,37 given the two essentials of an orderly and scientific meth-
35 On page 2 of his printel opinion and judgment in the Cesar case, judge Jarecki made the
following statement:
"I do not, however, agree with the attitude taken by some of these organizations in recom-
mending the non-payment of taxes.
"It must be realized [quoting Republic Inc. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292-296] 'that governments
are created to protect men in their natural rights, and with incidental protection to their civil
or political rights. No means has been devised, by which government can be maintained
without the use of revenue, and that revenue must be directly or indirectly drawn from the
governed.'
"Without revenue governments cannot function, and when a government ceases to function
all protection ceases, schools close, etc.
"In cases where taxpayers feel themselves aggrieved by exorbitant taxes they should tender
that portion of their taxes which they themselves feel or believe are due and afterwards file
objections to the disputed balance in order that the government may continue to function for
their own protection and that of the community."
It cannot be truthfully asserted, unfortunately, that this judicial admonishment was
markedly effective in stimulating tax payments.
36 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 23 L.Ed. 663 (1875); Raymond v. Chicago
Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 38, 52 L.Ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. 7 (1907); Taylor v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 88 Fed. 350 (C.C.A. 6th 1898); Keokuk & Hamilton Co. v. Salm,
258 U.S. 122, 125, 66 L.Ed. 496, 42 Sup. Ct. 207 (1922); Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb,
81 Ill. 556 (1876); Johnson v. Roberts, 102 Ill. 655 (1882). It should also be noted that
in the much discussed case of Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930), the
case most strongly relied upon by counsel for the objector in the Cesar case but distinguished
therein (see 182 N.E. 448, 454), the record reveals the important fact not stated in the opinion
in the case that the complainant had paid that part of the taxes upon his property which was
justly due, according to the allegations of his bill and offered to pay whatever additional
amount the court might find to be due.
37 One of the hopeful and constructive results flowing from the recent litigation is the
apparent approval which the Supreme Court has given to the principle and general procedure
of the modern system of real property assessment introduced in the 1928 reassessment in Cook
County, based upon Rules 14 and 15 promulgated by the State Tax Commission. See the
opinion in the Cesar case, x82 N.E. 448, 450, for a description of the methods used in the
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od and a competent and non-political personnel, the 1927 quadrennial
assessment had manifested a well nigh complete collapse of intelligence and
integrity in assessment in the Chicago area. 38 Subsequent developments
have shown the possibility of increasing within moderate limits the gross
amount and the relative proportion of personalty on the assessment roll.39
But to regard administrative dereliction of duty as the prime or even a
substantial responsible cause of lack of uniformity in assessment of per-
sonal property is to close one's eyes willfully to the lesson* of experience
wherever the general property tax has been tried.
The conditions existing in Cook County in 1928 were of no recent de-
velopment. From the beginning of its history the general property tax has
been the nucleus of the Illinois fiscal system. It was adopted at a time
when land formed the huge proportion of the wealth of the state, and
assessment of Mrs. Cesar's property. The best hope for uniformity in valuation of real property
is found in the perfection by ex-perience and the skillful application of this general type of tech-
nique. It must, of course, be applied with judgment and due allowance must be made for
special conditions and peculiarities in individual cases to produce the most satisfactory results.
But it is certainly a great improvement over the old hit-and-miss methods which were largely
responsible for the enormous inequalities contained in the 1927 quadrennial assessment. Com-
pare the hostile attitude toward a similar procedure of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Harleigh Realty Company's Case, 299 Pa. 385, 149 Atl. 653 (1930), and Lehigh & Wilkesbarre
Coal Company's Assessment, 298 Pa. 294, 300, 148 Atl. 3oi (1929).
31 Professor Simpson's informative study, Tax Racket and Tax Reform in Chicago (1930)
contains a striking picture of the low levels to which real estate assessment had fallen prior to
the 1928 reassessment. His data indicate that the 1928 assessment, while far from perfect,
was nevertheless a striking improvement and reduced by approximately half the deviation
from uniformity. See chart on p. i6o.
39 The following data were made available to the writer through the kindness of Mr. 0. L.
Altman of the County Assessor's office. Column I represents total assessment for Cook County
for the respective years; Column II the total personal property assessment; Column III the
ratio between I and II in terms of percentage of total represented by personalty.
I II IIl
1927 4,377,078,055 790,228,597 18. 1%
1928 4,043,929,819 689,867,120 17.1
1929 4,128,152,797 675,692,335 16.4
1930 4,516,485,826 769,842,262 17.0
1931 3,756,778,446 922,272,89o 24.5
1932 3,057,380,991 930,714,468 30.4
The figures given for 1932 are before revision by the board of appeals and subject to consid-
erable modification. Column I includes real estate, capital stock, personal property, and rail-
road assessments for Cook County as made by local assessment officers and the State Tax Com-
mission. Column II represents total assessments for Cook County on personal property, in-
cluding capital stock assessment as made by the local assessor, but excluding railroads. The
average for railroads for many years has been between four and five per cent of the total. It
will be noted that, while there has been a substantial increase in personal property assessment
totals since the low water mark in 1929, the major portion of the relief to property owners has
come through the striking reductions in real property valuations.
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when tangible personalty consisted largely of livestock, vehicles, and
similar chattels not easy to conceal. Intangibles were relatively unim-
portant, for the vast structure of corporate securities and public and
private obligations characteristic of modem capitalism was still in the
future. The basic assumption underlying the general property tax, viz.,
that ownership of property is a fair index of taxpaying capacity, was
under such simple conditions within speaking distance of reality. More-
over, the idea of uniformity and the phrase itself had a curious appeal to
a simple pioneer democracy. But such idyllic conditions were of short
duration, if indeed they ever existed. The researches of a nationally
known scholar in the field of public finance have proved beyond question
that the general property tax in Illinois tended as time went on to become,
in actual operation as it has everywhere else, a tax upon real estate.40
The practice of not listing intangibles soon became so universal as to take
on the force of a custom, despite vigorous attempts by legislatures and ad-
ministrative officials to force such property onto the rolls.
While the assessing machinery of Cook County was for many years
subjected to political control and prostituted to political ends to a degree
perhaps unprecedented in the United States and this fact gave rise to
certain peculiarly anti-social abuses,4' there can be little doubt that the
lack of vigor shown in the assessment of personal property, particularly
intangibles, met with the tacit approval of the dominant public opinion.
Whereas in other states, a tolerable solution has been found in the form
of laws providing for orderly classification of property for tax purposes or,
in some, a substitution of income tax or other forms of taxation for the
personal property tax, Illinois has continued, partly because of inertia and
partly due to inability to agree upon a constitutional amendment ac-
ceptable to all portions of the state, to adhere to an obsolete and impossible
theory. Loose and unsystematic classification by extra-legal processes has
been the inevitable result.42
Upon few questions of public finance will expert opinion be found in
such a unanimity of agreement as upon the proposition that the taxation
of all forms of property upon a uniform basis is impossible of achieve-
ment.43 Such a uniformity, if realized, would prove a sterile and arbitrary
40 Haig, History of the General Property Tax in Illinois (1914). See also Constitutional
Convention Bulletins, Illinois (1920).
41 Simpson, supra note 38.
42 Seligman, Essays in Taxation (1928); Jensen, Property Taxation in the United States
(193i); Leland, The Classified Property Tax in the United States (1928).
43 Supra note 42, and references cited. Professor Leland's book, pp. 14-39, contains an en-
lightening summary of the reasons for the breakdown of the general property tax.
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thing. Intolerable discrimination may result from an insistence upon
treating alike things which are inherently different. Common sense and
simple arithmetic will demonstrate that a rate of taxation which is at
least tolerable in the case of real estate is, when applied to interest-
bearing securities, ruinous and confiscatory. Capital will not tolerate such
treatment. It will find its way into tax-exempt forms of investment or will
quietly migrate to a jurisdiction where a sensible and reafistic policy pre-
vails. If it were possible really to enforce the uniform assessment of per-
sonal property in Illinois, it is no alarmist prediction that the conse-
quences would be catastrophic for all, not the least for the owners of real
property in the state.
It is profoundly significant in this connection that the Supreme Court
of the United States refused even to review the decisions of the Illinois
court in the Bistor and Cesar cases and that of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in American Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. McDonough.44
That court has generally recognized the necessity of allowing a wide lati-
tude for the exercise of legislative discretion in selecting the subjects of
taxation.45 It has wisely refused to identify the scope of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with that of the rigid type of
uniformity clause found in a few state constitutions, such as that of
Illinois, 46 and has sustained classification of property for tax purposes
where the basis of classification was not manifestly arbitrary in char-
acter.47 It follows that, so far as the federal Constitution is concerned,
the Illinois legislature would be free to classify personal property and pro-
vide for its taxation at rates varying within the different classes and
different from the rate with respect to real estate. It follows also that it
44 Supra note 22.
45 Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237, 33 L.Ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. 533
(r8go); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 67 L.Ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922);
State Board of Tax Com'rs. of Indiana et al. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 51 Sup.
Ct. 540 (1931) graduated license tax on chain stores sustained; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281
U.S. 146, x59, 74 L.Ed. 775, 50 Sup. Ct. 310 (1930). See Powell, Supreme Court Condonations
and Condemnations of Discriminatory State Taxation, 1922-25, 12 Va. L. Rev. 44I (1926).
46 In First National Bank of Urbana v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 983 (igio) at 895 the
court said: "It is not within the power of the Legislature to provide that different classes of
property shall be valued differently, and, if moneys, mortgages, bonds, or securities are valued
at a different proportion of their full value or on a different basis than other property, the Con-
stitution and law are both violated." This has been the consistent position of the Illinois Su-
preme Court with regard to the effect of Article IX. It would be difficult to reach a different
result under the strict provisions of Section i. Of course the same result would follow if classi-
fication were attempted by applying a different rate as between classes to a uniform valuation.
47 Supra note 45.
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might exempt forms of personal property, such as intangibles, from taxa-
tion altogether.4
It is submitted that classification by administrative action or omission
likewise does not of itself violate any substantive right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The mere fact that such administrative action
or omission is a violation of the state law is not material.49 Such violation
will and ought to be left to the remedial processes of state law. It is
beyond the proper function of the federal Supreme Court to undertake
the correction of such dereliction of official duty by state officers where
no federal right is involved. On the other hand, that Court has not hesi-
tated to interfere to protect members of a class from intentional and arbi-
trary discrimination as compared with others within the class, nor to
recognize the inadequacy of the remedies available under local law for
the correction of such discrimination.50
The one inescapable fact emerging from the recent welter of tax litiga-
tion in Illinois is that the courts were besought to attempt the enforce-
ment of the constitutional requirement of uniformity in the taxation of
all property and that they refused to do so. According to all the tests of
human experience this antiquated constitutional provision commands the
impossible. While a court may assert that it is "the duty to follow the
law, however serious and far-reaching the consequences [of its decision]
may be upon the processes of taxation and the continuance of public func-
tions and services,"5' one may well question the soundness of the position
taken if it is clear that the ensuing demoralization of public finance and
services will be in vain and that the net result will be to leave the ideal
of uniformity as far from realization as ever.
Are the courts of necessity constrained to pursue this will of the wisp?
48 Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 45. For a recent study of the progress of
classification in the United States, see Leland, The Classified Property Tax in the United
States (1928).
49 It is difficult to find case authorities squarely in point. Pointing strongly in this direc-
tion, see Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U.S. I65, 24 Sup. Ct. 53 (19o3); Coulter v. Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co., i96 U.S. 599, 25 Sup. Ct. 342 (igo5), where Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the court, found nothing objectionable under the federal Constitution in a discrimination
which was forbidden by the constitution of the state; Swiss Oil Co. v. Shanks, 273 U.S. 407,
413, 71 L.Ed. 709, 47 Sup. Ct. 393 (1927); Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24,
75 L.Ed. I40, 51 Sup. Ct. i5 (1930); Cf. Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 48 L.Ed.
737, 24 Sup. Ct. 502 (19o4); Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 38, 52 L.Ed. 78,
28 Sup. Ct. 7 (1907).
so Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 67 L.Ed. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 190
(1923), and cases therein cited.
"1 Opinion and judgment of Judge Jarecki of the County Court of Cook County in the Cesar
case, bottom page 3-
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Would it not be better frankly to recognize that this is one of the class of
constitutional guarantees which it is beyond the power of the courts to
enforce?
There are ample analogies to support such a position .52 It is a mistake
to assume that because a particular policy is commanded by the constitu-
tion ipso facto it is a part of the judicial function to enforce it. This may
be true even if private rights are involved5 3 There is no rule of thumb or
a priori principle by which to determine whether or not a particular con-
stitutional guarantee is of this type. The question must be determined
largely by practical considerations, among which are such desiderata as the
consequences of judicial intervention and its probable practical efficacy.5 4
It is not fatal to the above suggestion that courts have undertaken to en-
force uniformity clauses to the extent of holding unconstitutional acts of
the legislature attempting to legalize classification55 It does not follow
by remorseless logic from the fact that a given constitutional mandate is
11 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) i, 12 L.Ed. 58i (1849), holding enforcement of the con-
stitutional guarantee of a republican form of government not a judicial function; Pacific States
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 119, 32 Sup. Ct. 224 ('9xx), to same effect;
Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 511, 152 N.E. 557 (1926), refusing mandamus to compel members of
legislature to perform their constitutional duty of reapportioning the state (Article IV, Section
6) flagrantly disregarded for more than three decades; Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Ill. 437, 164 N.E.
665 (1929), certiorari denied 49 Sup. Ct. 349 (1928), refusing injunction against state treasurer
to restrain payment of expenses of 56th General Assembly and salaries of its members, theory
of bill being that they were holding office in violation of the constitution; People ex rel. Fergus
v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (293o), refusing to entertain quo warranto proceedings
against the members of the 56th General Assembly to test their title to their offices. Cf. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 67 L.Ed. 1078, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923),
where the Supreme Court refused to entertain jurisdiction of two suits, one brought by the
State of Massachusetts, the other by a citizen thereof, to enjoin the expenditure of funds appro-
priated under the Shepherd-Towner Maternity Act, it being contended that the purpose for
which the funds were to be expended was not national but fell within the domain of state power.
It would be difficult to contend that the constitutional infraction arising from failure to enforce
an obsolete and impossible uniformity requirement is as serious in its consequences as the stub-
born and defiant disregard of the reapportionment mandate. Taxation without adequate repre-
sentation is one of the possible results of the latter.
S3 Such was the fact in several of the cases cited in note 52 s11pra.
54 See particularly People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, supra note 52, at pp. 225-226 where
Mr. Justice Orr, speaking for the court, points out the disastrous consequences which might
flow from granting the relief prayed for. By denying such relief, the court did not, of course,
thereby approve the unconstitutional conduct of the members of the legislature. On the other
hand it vigorously condemned it in several of the above cases. One cannot escape the fact that
there are cases where the cure of judicial intervention may be worse than the disease against
which relief is sought.
"Adams v. Mississippi State Bank, 75 Miss. 701, 23 So. 395 (2897); First Nat. Bank of
Urbana v. Holmes, supra note 46, semble. But see on the question of the meaning of uniformity
Reed v. Bjornson et al., 253 N.W. 102 (Minn. 1934).
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judicially enforceable for one purpose or in one aspect it must likewise be
so in all. 6
It is believed that a frank adoption of such a position by the courts
would have a healthy and clarifying effect upon the whole tax situation.
The problem of proper distribution of the tax burden is essentially a po-
litical and legislative one. Until the Illinois constitution is amended so as
to give the legislature a larger measure of discretion or even complete
freedom in this respect, the present confused conditions will continue to
exist, and the courts are helpless to do anything effective about it. But
the manner in which some of these tax cases have been decided is not
likely to increase the public confidence in the administration of justice in
this state.
The public could be made to understand the reasons and justification
for a hands-off attitude on the part of the courts such as is advocated
above. It is useless to expect laymen to understand a decision which com-
pels every owner of property to resort to the courts for a writ of manda-
mus where a venal or an overworked board of review refuses him the
hearing to which he is legally and constitutionally entitled. The costs of
such a proceeding make the remedy unavailable to the great majority of
taxpayers. Moreover, in some years as many as one hundred thousand
complaints have been filed, and only a small fraction of the complainants
have been granted actual hearings by the board of review.
What would the consequence beif all these property owners filed peti-
tions for mandamus? What would the board be able to do about it if in
the majority of cases writs were granted? Under the quadrennial system
of assessment, with annual revisions, the assessing officials have only a few
months in which to complete their job if the extension of taxes and the
collection of the revenues upon which existence of government depends
are not to be indefinitely delayed. When the complaining taxpayers try
another tack and attempt by mandamus to compel the officials to perform
their duty of making a uniform assessment, they quickly find that it is
necessary for them virtually to make a complete assessment themselves
before the court will grant the writ. 7 Can they be blamed for regarding
56 People ex rel. Mooney v. Hutchinson, 172 Il. 486, 5o N.E. 599 (i898) where the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a legislative act reapportioning senatorial districts as in violation
of Article IV, Section 6 of the state constitution and awarded a writ of mandamus to the rela-
tor, directed to the county clerk of Will County, compelling him to receive and file relator's cer-
tificate of nomination for the office of state senator under the provisions of the act of 1893.
57 Cf. Sioux Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 67 L.Ed. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 190, 192
(1923) where Mr. Chief justice Taft points out the complete inadequacy of relief by mandamus
where the basis of the taxpayer's complaint is widespread and systematic undervaluation of
property.
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such decisions as mockeries upon justice? However sound or necessary
the policy upon which the decisions are based may be, its existence is ef-
fectively concealed under the (to the layman) mystifying legal jargon of
the opinions.
Even if taxpayers who have been refused a hearing by the board of re-
view, either singly or joining in a group as they have been allowed to do,51
secure a writ of mandamus compelling the board of review to grant them
a hearing, what have they accomplished? The writ does not purport to
tell the board how it shall exercise its judgmentsS" a Suppose the board
grants a hearing pursuant to the writ and after hearing sustains the com-
plainant's assessment, as it would normally do where the gravamen of the
complaint is not excessive valuation of his real property as compared with
other real property, but the failure of the assessors or the board to assess
personal property uniformly with real estate. Under the doctrine of the
Bistor case and the Cesar case the validity of the real estate assessment
as such is not affected. Could the taxpayer now secure equitable relief
on the ground of fraud? The most that can be said is that the outlook is
not promising. The difficulties in proving fraud in tax cases are in any
case very great.5 9 But in this particular situation it would appear that
s8 People ex rel. Ahlschlager et al. v. Board of Review of Cook County, 352 Ill. 157, 185 N.E.
248 (1933).
s1 People ex rel. Webb v. Jones et al., 256 Ill. 364, zoo N.E. 224 (1912).
S9 Occasionally a taxpayer is able to assemble evidence strong enough to support a charge
of fraud where he is put to the proof. Sometimes the overvaluation may be so excessive as to
warrant, if not necessitate, an inference of fraud. For cases in which the complainant succeed-
ed, see People's Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 64, 121 N.E. 629 (1919); People
ex rel. Carr v. Stewart, 315 Ill. 25, 145 N.E. 6oc (1924). An important fact here was
the arbitrary refusal of the board of assessors to consider data relating to sales of property
in the vicinity of the objector's property on the question of valuation. But the court is careful
to point out emphatically in both cases that the area within which estimates of value may vary
and yet result from honest exercise of judgment is wide.
Many of the cases in which taxpayers have succeeded on a charge of fraud have been de-
cided upon demurrer, where the tax officials have appealed from judgment against them on
demurrer instead of putting the taxpayer to the proof of his charge. For a case of this sort see
Aldrich v. Harding, 340 Ill. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930). In People v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge
Co., 287 Ill. 246, 122 N.E. 467 (I919) the Supreme Court reversed a judgment and order of sale
of the county court on the ground that the court erred in striking from the files objections
which charged arbitrary and fraudulent overassessment of objector's property. The case was
remanded for hearing on the merits, and the taxpayer was unable to make a sufficient showing
of fraud. People ex rel. McCallister v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. 295 Ill. 276, 129 N.E.
87 (1920).
In other cases where a taxpayer has succeeded in proving constructive fraud, it has been by
reason of the admitted use of some short-cut method or formula of assessment which the court
has regarded as arbitrary and calculated to produce a substantial overassessment. For cases of
this type see Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534, 167 Pac. 35 (917);
but cf. Sunday Lake & Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 186 Mich. 626, 153 N.W. 14 (igS), affd. 247
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the taxpayer is confronted with the same virtually insuperable obstacles
that baffled the relator in the Koester mandamus case. He would have the
burden of proving clearly and definitely that personal property is being
intentionally and systematically omitted from the assessment roll or
underassessed by the assessing officials.60 Should a plaintiff ever succeed
in satisfying this impossible burden, then the courts might find it difficult
to refuse him relief by quashing or reducing his assessment without frankly
admitting'the judicial unenforceability of the constitutional mandate of
uniformity.
As a matter of fact, a numerous and powerful group such as the owners
of real estate does not require court aid to protect its interests. Their
situation is fundamentally different from that of the plaintiff in Aldrich v.
Harding,6 the gravamen of whose complaint was fraudulent discrimina-
tion as between owners of real estate. The owners of real estate have at
last come to appreciate the realities of the situation and to see along what
lines salvation for themselves must be sought. The state property tax has
been abolished because of the enactment of a sales tax. The pressure for a
deflation of municipal budgets and for a reduction of assessed valuations
to conform more closely to real values has been inexorable and to a con-
siderable degree successful. The movement looking to the imposition of
a limitation on real property tax rates by legislative action or, if necessary,
by constitutional amendment is taking on formidable proportions.62 It is
U.S. 350, 38 Sup. Ct. 405 (i918); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 63 L.Ed. 602,
39 Sup. Ct. 276 (i919).
For a recent case in which the objector failed to prove legal fraud and which illustrates very
strikingly the difficulties of doing so, see People ex rel. McDonough v. Goldberg, 188 N.E. 428
(Ill. 1-933).
6o Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Il. 624, ii N.E. 417, 421 (1932). See particularly the last
paragraph of Mr. Justice De Young's opinion, and the cases there cited.
6, Supra note 59. The opinion of the Supreme Court in this case caused uncertainty and
confusion because of its approving quotation of the language .of Mr. Justice Taft in Taylor v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 88 Fed. 350, 374 (i898), to the effect that an assessment roll is
to be considered as one judgment, that fraud therein vitiates the roll, and anyone injuriously
affected thereby has a right to complain. The exact meaning of this language has never been
stated by the court, since the court went on to say (at p. 362) that "the only thing litigated is
the validity of the assessment on appellee's property, and a decision of that question cannot
operate as res adjudicata as to any other taxpayer or any other property." In other words, such
fraud does not ipso facto render the assessment roll null and void. What then does it do? A
possible view would be that proof of such fraud would destroy or weaken the strong presump-
tion in favor of the validity of administrative action, which ordinarily it is so difficult for the
taxpayer to overcome. Of course the administrative authorities charged with collection of
taxes would find their task immensely complicated if deprived of the benefit of such presump-
tion.
62 It is not intended to imply an opinion that any or all of these movements and measures
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to be hoped such property owners as a class will vigorously support such
an amendment of the constitution as will enable Illinois to enjoy a truly
up-to-date revenue system, for only in this does a permanent and satis-
factory solution lie. A revenue system suitable to the days of the covered
wagon cannot function much longer in an age of high-speed transporta-
tion and communication. There is cause for regret that the vast energy and
large sums of money poured into the sinkhole of futile litigation could not
have been mobilized behind some constructive program which had a
reasonable prospect of success.
If the difficulties in the way of making an adequate assessment of
personal property were not already well nigh insuperable, a very recent
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court has done much to make them so. In
the case of People v. Pullrnan Car & Mfg. Corporation the court held that
an assessment entered by the assessor in the column on the schedule en-
titled "all other personal property required to be listed" is constructively
fraudulent against the taxpayer and is a nullity to the extent that it in-
cludes items such as machinery, credits, bank stock, or money in bank
which were required by the statute to be listed in separate columns. 64
An action of debt was brought against the corporation to recover the un-
paid balance of a tax levied upon $5,200,000 of personal property. The
corporation returned an unsworn schedule bearing only its signature and
the figures 5,ooo,ooo, preceded by the dollar mark. These figures were not
placed opposite any of the forty classified items on the schedule but were
written at the bottom of column 2, entitled "Full Fair Cash Value." The
board of assessors did not require the corporation to make a statement of
its taxable property in accordance with the provisions of the statutes,6s
but made an assessment of $5,200,000 in the column entitled "All Other
Personal Property Required to be Listed." The equalizing factor of
thirty-seven per cent applied to assessed valuations of real estate in Cook
County was ignored by the assessors and the board of review, and this
apparently was the principal basis for the corporation's refusal to pay the
entire tax demanded, since it did pay $125,000 which was approximately
the tax due on an assessment of five million dollars equalized to thirty-
seven per cent. The objection of the assessor's failure to itemize the as-
are sound from the point of view of the general public interest. We merely wish to point out
that this organized group has turned from the courts to the normal political procedures and
processes of democratic government to secure protection for and consideration of its common
interests.
63 189 N.E. 278 (Ill. 1934).
64 Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, par. 107, Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1933, c: 120, § 339.
65 Cahill's Rev. Stat. x933, c. 120, par. 337; Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 120, § 295.
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sessment was raised apparently for the first time as a defense to the action
to recover the balance of the tax. Since more than ninety-nine per cent of
the corporation's personal property was found capable of classification
under the thirty-nine specific items listed on the schedule and to this
extent the assessment was held to be void, it seems that the Pullman Cor-
poration voluntarily paid many times more than the amount of tax that
was legally due.
The significance of this decision may not be immediately apparent to
any one not conversant with the administrative difficulties of making a
personal property assessment. The court states that it is the duty of the
assessor to make the assessment; that the taxpayer is only required to give
a full and accurate inventory of his property. The latter need not fix the
value of such property. The difficulty with all this is that the assessor has
no way under the law to compel the taxpayer to supply the necessary in-
formation. He is given no power to enter a home or factory to view and
appraise property or to gain access to private books and records.66 It
would seem that this decision not only compels the assessor to estimate
the total value of all the personalty of a given taxpayer, in itself a task
of no small proportions, but to guess at a proper distribution of this total
value among the Various items on the schedule.61 In the court's view sub-
stantial justice to the taxpayer requires that this distribution be made.
Failure to do so is not a mere irregularity, even though as in the principal
case the total assessment is by the corporation's own admission not exces-
sive, save for the failure to equalize.68 Ironically enough, if the assessor
does make such a distributed estimate and puts down figures for each
66 The Cook County assessor requested the legislature several years ago to amend the stat-
utes in such a way as to vest in him more adequate powers to obtain information needed in
assessing personal property, such as bank deposit records, inventories of goods in storage
warehouses, etc. No action was taken, however.
67 The validity of personal property assessments apparently depends, far more than former-
ly, if this decision stands, upon the powers of good guessing possessed by the assessor.
The State Tax Commission may mitigate the problem of the assessor somewhat by further
simplification of the personal property return, having already reduced the number of specific
classes from thirty-nine to fifteen. Suppose the Commission should see fit, because of this deci-
sion, to change the form so as to include all personal property in one class. In People v. Calu-
met Steel Co., 351 Ill. 451, i85 N.E. 586 (i933), the court held that the board of review was
without power under the statutes to make a "lump sum" assessment, but it did not suggest
that the legislature was without power to authorize it. See Town of Albertville v. Hooper, 196
Ala. 642, 72 So. 258 (1916) indicating that, without some listing or description of property,
there would be no assessment at all. There are probably limits here which cannot be trans-
gressed without encountering the objection of due process. Query, however, whether the due
process objection would lie if the taxpayer has been given an opportunity to furnish an accurate
inventory of his property and has failed to do so. Cf. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207
U.S. 127, 52 L.Ed. 134, 28 Sup. Ct. 47 (19o7).
6 i89 N.E. 278, 280.
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class which are in fact higher than true value but not to such a degree as
to be constructively fraudulent, the taxpayer is without relief under the
Illinois decisions.6 9 But if instead the assessor puts down the total of his
estimates in a single figure in one column the taxpayer can secure a
judgment that the entire assessment is void.
Could there be better evidence that the Supreme Court has confused
form with substance and has construed as mandatory a statute which
without danger to any substantial interest could safely have been inter-
preted as directory? The taxpayer knows better than anyone else what
property he owns. He can, if he wishes, obey the theoretical requirement
of the statute and give the assessor an inventory of his property. If he
does not do so, why should he complain if the assessor's undistributed esti-
mate is substantially fair to him? A comparison of this decision with the
Cesar and Bistor cases reveals a paradox in that an overburdened owner of
real estate can secure no effective relief where an assessor fails for any
reason to assess personal property as the law requires; yet a person whose
personalty is not overassessed as regards amount but is not properly
entered upon the roll, can escape payment of the tax altogether. Is not
this a case of straining at a legal gnat and swallowing a camel?
There remains one other important chapter in the Cook County tax
litigation to be considered, viz., that which began with the so-called
"fifteen per cent" order issued by the board of appeals of that county on
March 22, 1933, which order was subsequently sustained after a hearing
before the State Tax Commission by a two to one vote of the members of
that body. The order was issued upon the basis of a verified complaint
filled by one Thomas Harvatt, as owner of a small bungalow, alleging that
the assessment thereon was excessive, and that there was a general lack of
uniformity in the assessment for the year 1931 on income-producing and
commercial property on the one hand and residence and small apartment
buildings on the other, in that the base price used by the assessor in
making the assessment on the latter classes was relatively too high. It was
further alleged that for this reason a revision of the entire assessment of all
real estate in Cook County was necessary. Without a hearing on the com-
plaint and without notice to the assessor 70 an order was entered by the
69 Supra note So and cases therein cited. One may well conclude, if the legislature does
nothing to strengthen the powers of the assessor in the assessment of personal property and
makes no effort to nullify the holding in the Pullman case, supra note 63, by amendment of the
statute, that the legislature is quite in accord with the tacit public approval in past years of lax
enforcement of the personal property tax.
70 The procedure of the board of appeals was, to say the least, rather precipitate and was
beyond question in violation of the explicit provision of the statute which provides: "No hear-
ing upon any complaint shall be held until the person or corporation affected and the assessor
who certified the assessment have each been notified and given an opportunity to be heard
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board directing the assessor to revise the assessment on all cottages,
bungalows, residences, homes, and two-flat and three-flat buildings by
reducing the base price on which all such assessments were made by fifteen
per cent. Since the order did not purport to affect land valuations, it was
estimated that it would result in a net saving of between seven and eight
per cent on tax bills to the owners of the enumerated classes of property.
Shortly thereafter, one Thomas, a resident and taxpayer of Cook
County, filed in the Supreme Court as relator a petition for a writ of
mandamus commanding the members of the board of appeals to convene
and vacate and expunge the order. By virtue of a stipulation the issue
to be determined was limited solely to the power and jurisdiction of the
board to enter the order. In People ex rel. Thomas v. Nixon et al.,7' the
Supreme Court, with justices De Young and Stone dissenting, sustained
the attack upon the order and awarded the writ prayed for. It was ad-
mitted by the parties and the court that the old board of review possessed
the lawful power to issue such an order. The court divided as to the effect
of the amendments to the revenue act, popularly known as the Kelly
Bill,72 which revamped the tax-assessing machinery of Cook County, sub-
stituting a single assessor for the old board of assessors of five, and a board
of appeals consisting of two members for the old board of review of three.
The new officials were made appointive till the i934 election; thereafter
elective. The majority of the court concluded that the amendments with-
held from the board of appeals certain powers theretofore possessed by
the board of review, and that the functions and powers of the new board
were limited to those of a reviewing body, empowered only to revise the
assessment on particular property described in a complaint filed by some
taxpayer. Any general revision of assessment of whole classes of property
such as was attempted by the order of the board was thereby excluded.
Mr. Justice De Young in an able dissenting opinion73 disagreed with
the interpretation of the amended statutes upon which the above decision
was based and argued that such an interpretation vested a dangerous power
in a single assessing official. He asserted that "judicial decision should per-
mit only the clearest statutory language to withhold from a reviewing
body the power of revision. Experience has demonstrated that this power
is vitally necessary even to approximate equality and uniformity in taxa-
tion."?4
thereon." Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 12o, par. 346 (2). By virtue of the stipulation referred to
in the text, however, this question did not come before the Supreme Court in the Nixon case.
7X 187 N.E. 65o (1933). 73 187 N.E. 65o , 653.
7Laws of 1931-32, Special Sess. p. 65. 74 Supra note 73, at p. 656.
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It is difficult to accept the argument for either of the two conflicting
interpretations of the statute as conclusive. The amendments were poorly
drafted and replete with unfortunate ambiguities. They were enacted
only after a long and bitter struggle in the legislature and were the result
of a compromise. There can be little doubt that the interpretation favored
by the majority was in accord with the public understanding of the pur-
poses of the Kelly bill. The movement for an overhauling of tax machin-
ery in Cook County was the result of general dissatisfaction with a system
which superimposed upon the assessing authority a board of review which
was to all intents and purposes a second assessing body. This situation
had led to constant bickering between the two assessing authorities, as well
as to division and evasion of responsibility. It had lent itself so well to
sinister political manipulation and the secret activities of professional tax
fixers that public confidence in the whole machinery of assessment had
been destroyed. It was a type of organization which had been abandoned
generally throughout the country as unsatisfactory. 75
In the light of the experience of Cook County and other jurisdictions,
it is impossible to agree that the extract from the dissenting opinion
quoted above76 is supported by the facts. In any event, whatever doubt
there may have been as to the proper interpretation of the legislative in-
tent expressed in these amendments was removed by a further amend-
ment 77 which makes it perfectly clear that the powers of the board of ap-
peals are limited to the revision of assessments of particular properties.
Very recently the county court of Cook County has undertaken to do
in effect what the Supreme Court held the board of appeals was without
power to do. Following the above decision, an organized movement was
initiated with the support of certain powerful newspapers and real estate
organizations to secure relief in some other way from the asserted dis-
crimination against owners of homes and small flats. Several hundred
thousand taxpayers who had not yet paid the second installment of 1931
taxes, due in September, 1933, were permitted to file objections in the
county court based upon this alleged discrimination, forms for the purpose
being printed in or supplied by these newspapers. Property owners who
had already paid their taxes in full were unable to take advantage of the
75 Simpson, Tax Racket and Tax Reform in Chicago (1930), 204-215.
,6 Supra note 74.
77 "The board of appeals shall hear complaints and revise assessments of any particular par-
cel of real estate or the assessment of personal property of any person or corporation mentioned
or described in a complaint filed with the board and conforming to the requirements of sec. 3 5b
of this Act and shall make revisions in no other cases." L. 1933, p. 868, filed July 13. Now
found in Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 120, par. 146(1).
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proceeding and must look to special legislation to give them the benefit
by way of rebate or credit on future taxes of the order entered a few days
ago by the court.
After a hearing lasting many weeks in which a large mass of testimony
was introduced in support of and attacking the assessment roll, including
much expert opinion, Judge Jarecki held that the charges of discrimina-
tion had been sustained and granted relief by ordering a reduction of
fifteen per cent in the base prices used in assessing the above classes of
property. The order does not affect unimproved property nor does it ap-
ply to outhouses and like subsidiary structures. It is uncertain at the
time of this writing whether or not the order will be given effect by the
assessor for the remaining years of the quadrennial period. It is equally
uncertain how many taxpayers will be able to qualify for reduction of
assessment under the terms of the order and how large a net saving will
be realized by them, in view of statutory penalties accumulating since
last September. The two certainties are that newspaper propaganda
greatly exaggerated the possible benefits of such a reduction to small
property owners and that the delay incident to revision of the assessments
on hundreds of thousands of parcels of property will tend further to
demoralize the disorganized public finances and credit by hampering col-
lection of taxes.
It would be improper without a careful study of the record and the
evidence in the proceeding to express an opinion as to whether the court
was warranted in finding discrimination between classes of such character
as to amount to constructive fraud justifying judicial intervention under
the precedents established by the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court.
So far as one may rely upon the summaries of testimony appearing in the
columns of the press, it would appear that there was much difference of
opinion between competent experts as to the fairness and accuracy of the
basic rates used by the assessor in making the assessment. If, as this
difference of opinion might tend to suggest, the assessor did not exceed
the broad limits of reasonable discretion and judgment which he possesses
under a constitution and statute which vests in administrative authority
to the exclusion of the courts the function of assessment,78 the order of the
court would appear to be open to attack upon an appeal as exceeding the
bounds of judicial jurisdiction.7 9 It is submitted that the public interest
78 It would be a work of supererogation to cite the numerous opinions of the Supreme Court
of Illinois which iterate and reiterate this proposition. See for instance the cases cited in note
59, SUpra.
79 There is a marked tendency observable for courts to disregard this settled doctrine as to
their proper place in tax administration and enforcement. Particularly in the case of suits
brought to collect unpaid personal property taxes does the procedure in court have the appear-
ance of an administrative review of the assessment.
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from the long view demands that such an appeal be taken, despite the
further regrettable delays in tax collection which such appeal would in-
volve. The order of the court, if unfounded in law, establishes a dangerous
precedent and opens the door to political manipulation of assessment in
the future. °
The great and important powers which the assessor possesses in Cook
County, and which an assessor must possess under any system of assess-
ment which seeks to avoid the intolerable evils resulting from conflict
and overlapping of authority, are susceptible of abuse and of prostitu-
tion to political ends by an incompetent, corrupt, or politically minded
official. The litigation of the past five years demonstrates the futility of
reliance upon judicial remedies as a corrective of the evils inherent in a
system based upon the general property tax. The established jurisdiction
to correct fraudulent discrimination against individual taxpayers loses
much of its practical value because of the great difficulties involved in
proving fraud. The remedy of mandamus to compel aproper performance
of his official duty by the assessor is, as we have seen, of very limited
value. No assessor, however high minded and competent, can produce
more than partially satisfactory results when chained to such an obsolete
and impossible tax system as that of Illinois. Fundamental constitutional
changes are a condition precedent to real reform. But under any fiscal
system which involves the processes of valuation and the exercise of
judgment in its administration, there can be no substitute for integrity,
technical competence, and freedom from political entanglements and in-
fluence in the administrative authority.8 '
60 The Chicago Daily Tribune for Wednesday, April i8, 1934, P. ii reveals that Chicago
bankers have manifested reluctance to purchase tax warrants of municipal corporations in
Cook County, since the decision of Judge Jarecki was announced and since official decision not
to appeal the order has become apparent. The fear is expressed that the court has arrogated
to itself the function of revision of assessment and that a stable legal assessment roll upon which
the security of tax warrants depends is made more difficult of realization. The fears expressed
appear to have some justification.
81 In the early part of 1933 the Legislature enacted a law which goes under the name of the
Skarda Act. See Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. x933, C. 120, §§ 238a-238c. The purpose of this
measure was to bring extraordinary pressure to bear upon large property owners to pay taxes
in default. It did this by vesting in certain courts the power to appoint the county collector
receiver of properties taxes upon which should be more than six months in default, with power
to manage and administer the same and apply income therefrom to payment of taxes. Re-
ceivers were appointed in a number of cases by the county court, and the threat of such re-
ceiverships has undoubtedly been effective in some cases to induce payment of taxes where
the capacity to pay is present. The constitutionality of this statute and the validity of the
proceedings thereunder are now being questioned in the courts. In the background is the ques-
tion of the power of the county court to appoint such a receiver without the authority of
statute. The varied legal issues which this legislation presents fall beyond the purview of the
present article.
